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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2 (3)(a) and (5), and the Order of the Supreme Court granting certiorari dated 
February 21, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Are Masseys' tax deed titles superior to Defendants' titles claimed under 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Standard of Review: The District Court decided this issue in favor of the 
Defendants' boundary by acquiescence titles and against Masseys' tax deed titles by 
granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court's summary judgment. 
" 'On certiorari, [this court] reviews the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness; focusing on 'whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision 
under the appropriate standard of review.' State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 7, 95 P.3d 276." 
Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 8, 116 P.3d 290. " <[B]ecause a summary judgment 
presents questions of law, [this court] accordfs] no particular deference to the court of 
appeals' ruling' and review it for correctness. Mitchell, 2001 UT 80 at ]f 8 (citing Ron 
l 
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1989))." Salt 
Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, Tf 11, 89 P.3d 155. "'In the 
context of a summary judgment motion, which presents a question of law, [this Court] 
employ[s] a correctness standard and view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.' Hermansen v. 
Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 10, 48 P. 3d 235." Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, ^ 7, 94 P. 3d 
915. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351.1 (9)(a): 
The county auditor shall, after acceptance by the county governing body, and 
in the name of the county, execute deeds conveying in fee simple all property 
sold at the public sale to the purchaser and attest this with the auditor's seal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351.1 (9)(b): 
When the [tax] deed is executed and delivered by the auditor, it shall be prima 
facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent to the date the 
taxes initially became delinquent and of the conveyance of the property to the 
grantee in fee simple. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1362: 
A copy of the record of any tax sale duly certified by the official custodian of 
the record at the time of the certificate under the seal of office as a true copy of 
the entry in the official record showing the sale is prima facie evidence of the 
facts shown in the record. The regularity of all proceedings connected with 
the assessment, valuation, notice, equalization, levies, tax notices, 
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advertisement, and sale of property described in the record is presumed, and 
the burden of showing any irregularity in any of the proceeding resulting in 
the sale of property for the nonpayment of delinquent taxes shall be on the 
person who asserts it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title and for trespass and waste to real property commenced 
by H. C. Massey and Betty P. Massey (Masseys), Plaintiffs in the District Court. 
Defendants are adjacent property owners whose claim of title is based on the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. Masseys' claim of title is based upon conveyances by tax deeds 
from Weber County recorded prior to Defendants' conveyances. 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment supported by memoranda 
containing lengthy statements of undisputed fact purportedly supported by lengthy exhibits 
including affidavits. R. at 601-83, 785-96 and 852-50. Masseys duly disputed many of the 
facts propounded by Defendants. R. at 815-851. Masseys believe that the facts set forth 
herein fairly state those facts which are not in dispute. 
The motions were submitted without oral argument and the Court entered its 
"Ruling Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment." R. at 962-67. At a subsequent 
telephonic hearing between the Court and counsel and based upon certain concessions of 
fact made by Masseys' attorney the Court verbally granted the Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment and directed counsel for Defendants to prepare appropriate findings of 
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fact, conclusions of law and a final order. R. at 1014. The final findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared by Defendants counsel incorporated by reference the Courts 
earlier conditional ruling. R. at 98 - 99. Copies of the trial court's initial ruling, the 
transcript of the subsequent telephonic hearing, and the findings, conclusions and final 
order are included in the Addendum hereto. 
On the issue before this court on certiorari, the trial court ruled that "all relevant 
deeded property parcels may be modified pursuant to the legal concepts of boundaries by 
acquiescence, and if that resulted historically in possessed land different than shown by 
recorded deeds or conveyances, and the tax payment conditions have been met as set forth 
in the paragraph above [that is, taxes were timely paid on tax notices issued on the land 
described in the recorded deeds]... the resultant parcels will also possess a priority over the 
tax deeds. In other words, if Massey claims lands possessed by persons entitled to establish 
boundaries different than shown by the recorded deeds and they show payment of taxes on 
their adjacent record deed property, the Court concludes those property lines established by 
acquiescence will be acceptable to include the addition (or exclude the excess) property in 
their parcels, even though the boundaries are different than shown on the recorded deeds, 
and may thereby defeat the Massey tax deed claims." R. at 963-64. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that "even if a small portion 
of the land was not described in the tax notices, it became part of Defendants' parcels," 
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citing Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145,117, 24 P.3d 997. Massey v. Griffith 2005 
UT App 410 at %l1. Addendum 5. (The Court of Appeals described the differences 
between the deed/tax notice descriptions and the boundaries by acquiescence as not 
"precisely" matching; "slight"; and "small". Id. The record does not support these 
descriptions See Addendum 6.). 
This Court granted certiorari only on the issue of "whether a tax sale takes priority 
over property claimed under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence." Order, Feb. 21, 
2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves real property located in the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West in Weber County, Utah. Masseys purchased four 
separate parcels located in the Southeast Quarter at tax sale. Two of the parcels were 
conveyed to the Masseys by tax deeds dated June 12, 1986, and recorded June 13, 1986. 
R. at 989-90. The other two parcels were conveyed to the Masseys by tax deeds dated on 
June 8, 1992, and recorded June 10, 1992. R. at 990-91. The four parcels were 
contiguous. R. at 839. 
Kenneth A. Griffiths (Griffiths), BKB LLC (BKB) and 12X12, L.L.C. (12X12) 
are each successors in interest to a parcel of real property (the Griffiths Property). The 
Griffiths Property was first conveyed to Griffiths by warranty deed dated after the 
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recording of all of the tax deeds, on September 10, 1993, and recorded on September 23, 
1993. R. at 643-44. Griffiths conveyed the Griffiths Property to BKB by warranty deed 
dated and recorded January 24, 1994. BKB conveyed the Griffiths Property to 12X12 by 
Quit Claim Deed dated October 26, 2000, and recorded November 1, 2000. R. at 987. 
The Defendants Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars (collectively, Buttars) 
claim an interest in a parcel (the Buttars Property) also located in the Southeast Quarter 
of Section 24 to the south of the Griffiths Property. R. at 839. The Buttars Property was 
conveyed to Buttars by Brenda's mother, Defendant Adele B. Lewis (Lewis), by 
Warranty Deed also dated and recorded after Masseys' tax deeds, on December 5, 1994. 
R. at 988-89. 
A "very old fence" serves as the occupation line between the Griffiths Property 
and the Buttars Property. R. at 818. The legal description of Masseys' tax deed 
properties straddles the old fence and overlaps the historical occupation of the Griffiths 
Property and the Buttars' Property. R. at 819. The Defendants and their predecessors 
have paid taxes on legal descriptions contained in the tax notices issued to them by the 
County. R. at 1014, p. 10. However, Masseys contend that these legal descriptions are not 
adjacent and do not include the properties described in their tax deeds. R. at 1014, § 9 and 
10 and R. at 839. Addendum 6. This remains a disputed fact. 
6 
Thus the facts for purposes of this summary judgment are that Masseys purchased 
at tax sale properties not included in Defendants' deeds or tax notices but occupied by 
Defendants on both sides of a boundary by acquiescence (the very old fence). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The old rule of strictissimi juris as it applied to the tax sale process has been 
abandoned. The modern rule recognizes the importance of the tax collection process to 
the continuation of essential government services and accords tax titles with the utmost 
degree of sanctity. The trial court and court of appeals failed to recognize this important 
shift in public policy. They also failed to accord Masseys' tax titles the presumptions to 
which they were entitled and improperly shifted the burden to Masseys to show lack of 
defect in the tax collection process. 
Tax titles should enjoy priority over titles claimed by boundary by acquiescence. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and this case remanded to the 
District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
Some early Utah cases dealing with tax sale issues applied the rule of strictissimi 
juris and required that every aspect of the tax sale process must be conducted according to 
the strict requirements of the governing statutes: 
It is elemental, and settled beyond argument in this jurisdiction, that 
tax sale proceedings and statutes are strictissimi juris. The sales are 
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made exclusively under statutory authority. The seller is making a 
sale not coupled with an interest, and derives his authority solely from the 
statute, and it is derived from no rule or principle of the common law. He 
can have no authority to sell except as he is made the agent of the law for 
that purpose, and, if the steps necessary to precede his action fail, he is not 
invested with legal right to make the sale; if one step fails, they all fail. The 
rule, therefore, is that all the preliminary requirements of the statute, made 
conditions to the exercise of the right and power to sell, and designating the 
various proceedings which culminate in the sale, must have been strictly 
complied with. The officers who execute this power should follow the steps 
outlined for its exercise with precision. It is a special jurisdiction and must 
be strictly pursued. As was said in Wister v. Kemmerer, 2 yeates 100, "An 
exact and punctual adherence to the laws can alone divest the title of lands 
on a sale for nonpayment of taxes." When the statutes governing the sale 
of lands for taxes direct an act to be done, or the manner, time, form, or 
place of doing it, such act must be done as prescribed, and the statutes must 
be strictly, if not literally, complied with. 
Tintic Undine Mi?2ing Co. v. Ercanbrack 93 Utah 561, 567, 74 P. 2d 1184 (1938) 
(citations omitted). 
This attitude followed the long established tradition of American courts to look 
upon tax titles with a jaundiced eye: 
It had become proverbial, that a tax title was no title at all; and a sale for taxes 
was as near a mockery as any proceeding having the appearance of legal 
sanction could be. The principal cause was the difficulty in proving the 
various steps essential to the validity of such sale ... 
Fredericksen v. LaFleur, 632 P. 2d 827, fn. 1 (Utah 1981). 
However, other early Utah cases recognized that the critical importance of the 
revenue collection function of government requires that tax titles be highly favored and 
procedural flaws overlooked: 
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The first and paramount necessity for social order, personal liberty, 
and private property is the maintenance of civil government; and 
government cannot exist without revenues. The necessity and 
importance of preferring the lien for general taxes over other claims 
are so impelling that the priority of the sovereign claims of the state 
will not be depreciated or denied without warrant from the Legislature 
in clear and unmistakable terms;... 
Robinson v. Hanson, 282 P. 782, 784 (Utah 1929); 
The purchaser from the county (not a redemptioner) takes title free and 
clear of liens, otherwise the county would be hampered in collection of 
taxes and prevented from again having the property returned to the 
assessment rolls. 
Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 400, 407 (Utah 1935). 
These two seemingly contradictory lines of authority appear to have been 
resolved by this Court in favor of the later in the case of A.C Financial Inc. v. Salt 
Lake County, 948 P.2d 771 (Utah 1997). In A.C. Financial this court was faced with 
the issue of whether liens on real property for personal and real property taxes are 
subject to a trust deed interest created before accrual of the taxes underlying the 
liens. The trust deed lien holder asked the Court to overrule the Court's earlier 
decision in Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486, 
(1926) (holding that tax liens enjoy priority over previously created contractual 
liens). In reaffirming Black, the Court gives heavy emphasis to the policy that the 
tax collection function of government requires that tax liens and tax titles be given 
high priority: 
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In addition, the holding of Black is more closely integrated into Utah law 
than is immediately apparent. Because Black involved not only liens for 
personal property taxes on real property, but also the liens for the real 
property taxes owed on the same parcel, it also brought into Utah law the 
widely accepted rule that real property tax liens have priority over all other 
claims on the property taxed. Black is the earliest Utah case for that rule, 
but later cases recognize the rule (although they do not cite Black for it) in 
holding that a tax sale extinguishes all prior private claims on the property. 
See Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 438-39, 46 P.2d 400, 406 (1935) 
(acknowledging that purchasers of tax deed receive new title under 
independent grant of title which extinguishes all previous private titles and 
encumbrances); see also Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 
1991) (mentioning same); Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1303 
(Utah 1982) (citing rule in Hansen). The statute providing for tax sales 
implicitly recognizes this rule and the underlying holding of Black with 
regard to real property taxes by defining the title granted at a tax sale as a 
"fee simple" title — i.e., one unencumbered by other claims. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-1351. l(9)(a) (1996). Not recognizing tax lien priority in 
the context of tax sales would significantly dilute the State's ability to 
dispose of property at such sales because the buyer would be subject to 
other claims on the property. 
A.C. Financial at 776. 
To promote the strength of tax deeds and thus the revenue collection function of 
State and local government, the legislature has adopted several provisions. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-303(1): 
No mistake in the name or address of the owner or supposed owner of 
property render the assessment invalid. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-135l.l(9)(a): 
The county auditor shall, after acceptance by the county governing body, 
and in the name of the county, execute deeds conveying in fee simple all 
property sold at the public sale to the purchaser and attest this with the 
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auditor's seal. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-1351.l(9)(b): 
When the [tax] deed is executed and delivered by the auditor, it shall be 
prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent to 
the date the taxes initially became delinquent and of the conveyance of 
the property to the grantee in fee simple. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-1362: 
A copy of the record of any tax sale duly certified by the official 
custodian of the record at the time of the certificate under the seal of 
office as a true copy of the entry in the official record showing the sale 
is prima facie evidence of the facts shown in the record. The regularity 
of all proceedings connected with the assessment, valuation, notice, 
equalization, levies, tax notices, advertisement, and sale of property 
described in the record is presumed, and the burden of showing any 
irregularity in any of the proceedings resulting in the sale of property 
for the nonpayment of delinquent taxes shall be on the person who 
asserts it. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-1363: 
If property is sold for correctly imposed taxes as the property of a 
particular person, no misnomer of the owner or supposed owner, or 
other mistake relating to ownership, affects the sale or renders it void 
or voidable. 
In the trial court and the court of appeals Masseys essentially argued that since tax 
titles are favored as a matter of public policy and they are entitled to a presumption that 
all aspects of the tax sale process was regularly conducted, then they should prevail on a 
motion for summary judgment as against the boundary by acquiescence occupiers (the 
Defendants) unless the Defendants could demonstrate some defect in the process. Since 
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the Defendants failed in their burden of demonstrating any defect in the process, they 
should not have been granted summary judgment. The trial court and court of appeals 
both erroneously shifted the burden to the Masseys to prove a lack of defect in the 
process. This was error. 
Both courts below held that the claims of the Defendants to the property in dispute 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence had priority over Masseys' claims under 
their tax deeds. The trial court failed to explain the basis of its decision. The Court of 
Appeals relied on Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145, 24 P.3d 997. 
Mason v. Loveless is the only case found by Masseys' counsel that has ever 
addressed the issue of priority of tax deed titles vs. titles claimed under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. It was not the primary issue in the Mason case and the court 
spends only two paragraphs analyzing the issue. The court bases its conclusion on two 
factors. 
First the court notes that ordinarily a tax sale does not extinguish easements and 
restrictive covenants charged upon the property sold, citing Holly Piehler Rockwell, 
Annotation, Easement, Servitude, or Covenant as Affected by Sale for Taxes, 7 A.L.R. 
5th 187,203 (1992), and Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169P.2d781 (1946). The court 
reasoned that since a tax deed does not extinguish an adverse claim such as an easement 
or covenant, then it must not extinguish other adverse claims either. This reasoning 
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overlooks the fact that tax deed titles extinguish trust deed interests, A. C. Financial, and 
judgment liens, special assessment liens, statutory liens, landlord liens, claims of 
homestead, claims of attaching creditors or ground rents and rent charges, among other 
claims against title 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 874. 
Second, the Mason v. Loveless court reasoned that to hold otherwise would 
contravene the Fifth Amendment's protection against taking property without due 
process of law. Without analyzing the correctness of that holding on the basis of the 
Mason v. Loveless facts, the same reasoning does not apply in the instant case. In the 
instant case the last of the tax deeds was recorded June 8, 1992. All of the Defendants 
acquired their interests subsequent to that date. The Defendants therefore had 
constructive notice of Masseys' tax title and took subject thereto. See section 57-3-2 (1) 
Utah Code ("Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title... shall from the time of recording with the appropriate County 
Recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents."). In other words, Defendants are 
asserting the deprivation of their predecessors' constitutional rights, not their own rights. 
The Tenth Circuit was faced with this very issue in the case of Kemmerer Coal 
Co. v. Brigham Young University, 723 F.2d 54 10th Cir. (1983). The Court stated its 
holding as follows: 
Kemmerer contends that due process was violated based on the following 
undisputed facts. Its predecessor, San Rafael, received no notice of the tax 
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assessment on the coal and received only publication notice of the resultant 
sale of the coal rights. . . . These factors arguably indicate that the county 
deprived San Rafael of due process by its slipshod procedure . . . . 
Kemmerer itself has suffered no due process injury. If a constitutional 
violation occurred, it was the taking of San Rafael's property without due 
process. Kemmerer thus seeks to advance its claim by asserting a third-
party's constitutional rights. 'The general rule is that 'a litigant may only 
assert his own constitutional rights or immunities. . . .'" This rule has been 
applied to bar a grantee's assertion that its grantor's due process rights were 
violated. . . . We believe the Utah Supreme Court would hold that 
Kemmerer has no standing to assert a third-party's constitutional rights 
under the facts of this case . . . . [W]e do not believe it fundamentally 
unfair to apply the statute of limitations to Kemmerer who bought the coal 
lands in the face of record notice of a rival claim to "underground rights." 
Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed with the Tenth Circuit: 
The Tenth Circuit made an accurate forecast. . . .When Shelledy purchased 
the property from SBA in 1988, he was on record notice of defendants' 
rival claim to the property by virtue of the 1984 tax deed. Therefore, we 
hold that Shelledy lacks standing to assert the SBA's constitutional rights 
and defense. 
Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1992). 
Defendants were all on notice of Masseys' tax title at the time they took title to the 
property and are in no position to complain that Masseys' title trumps theirs. 
It is the clear intent of the legislature that tax titles are new grants from the 
sovereign and should be accorded the highest priority. Previous decisions of this Court 
have recognized this doctrine. If tax titles are not accorded the highest priority, the tax 
collecting authority of the state will be seriously hampered. 
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If an error has been made by the county resulting in the taking of Defendants 
property, that error can be compensated by the County to the Defendants. Better that 
than a depreciation in the prospective tax title purchaser's expectations of the value of the 
tax titles being offered for sale. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to earlier times, tax titles are favored and enjoy priority over most other 
interests. They are a new fee simple title issued by the sovereign. They have been held by 
this court and the courts of many other states to have priority over a variety of other 
interests in the foreclosed property. Absent some defect in the assessment or sale process 
Masseys' tax titles should be granted priority over Defendants' titles based on the boundary 
by acquiescence doctrine. Defendants have failed to demonstrate any defect in the 
assessment or sale process. They are not entitled to claim the due process interest of their 
predecessors. The ruling of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded 
to the district court. 
Respectfully submitted, this / ^"day of April, 2006. 
FRANK S.WARNER 
Attorney for Appellants/Petitioners 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
H.C. MASSEY and BETTY P. MASSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH A. GRIFFITHS, et al., 
Defendant's. 
RULING 
CONDITIONALLY DENYING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960900027 PR 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
FEB 1 1 2004 
^9 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant 12X12 LLC (12X12) and Defendant's Buttars 
and Lewis' (Buttars) Motions for Summary Judgment. Both 12X12 and Buttars contend they and 
their predecessor owners have always paid taxes on the property claimed by Massey's and therefore, 
Weber County had no title to convey with the tax deeds given to Massey's. They contend that the 
fence lines have created a boundary by acquiescence that should control ownership of the property 
in question and resolve any boundary discrepancies from the recorded deeds. 
Plaintiff s claim that the descriptions in their tax deeds establish the ownership of the property 
to them. They further claim that the tax payment evidence filed by movant's is hearsay and that this 
Court cannot accept such hearsay evidence. They contend that the affidavits filed contain legal 
conclusions rather than facts, and should be disregarded in that respect, leaving substantial material 
evidentiary disputes. They further argue that the property interest claims ofthese present Defendant's 
are all subsequent to the Massey's tax deeds and therefore are inferior to Massey's claims. 
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to grant summary judgment and denies 
those motions. The Court notes, however, that admissible evidence is very possibly available to show 
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»i taxes have been paid by each of the defendant's or their predecessors on the recorded deeds o f 
«ti property they claim. 
v 
It will undoubtedly be helpful to all parties to know the tentative conclusions of law the Court 
has reached in reviewing the case. 
1. TAX DEEDS. 
Tax deeds in Utah have been given a substantial priority status under UCA §78-12-5.2, 5.3 
& Utah case law. However, the Court concludes that based on the uncontroverted facts of this case, 
I 
the plaintiff tax deed holders do not necessarily gain a priority of position over recorded deed holders, 
even though subsequent holders behind the Massey tax deeds might not have been in occupancy at 
the time the tax deeds issued, provided those title holders otherwise held good title. Therefore, based 
on the uncontroverted evidence in this case, if it is shown by competent evidence that taxes were paid 
on the deeded property at issue in this case in a timely fashion, the Weber County tax deeds would 
have been improperly issued, and as to those lands upon which the taxes were paid timely, are inferior 
to the otherwise valid title holders in this case to such property. The Court also rejects Plaintiffs 
argument that the Massey Deeds should have priority over subsequent title holders who can trace 
their titles to title holders described above (and in the next succeeding paragraph.) 
2. BOUNDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The Court concludes that in this case, all relevant deeded property parcels may be modified 
pursuant to the legal concepts of boundaries by acquiescence, and if that resulted historically in 
possessed land different than shown by recorded deeds or conveyances, and the tax payment 
conditions have been met as set forth in the paragraph above relating to 'tax deeds', the resultant 
«3' 
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H parcels will also possess a priority over the tax deeds. In other words, if Massey claims lands 
i; 
tti possessed by persons entitled to establish boundaries different than shown by the recorded deeds and 
»i 
v 
$1 
they show payment of taxes on their adjacent record deeded property, the Court concludes those 
property lines established by boundary by acquiescence will be acceptable to include the additional 
(or exclude the excess) property in their parcels, even though the boundaries are different than shown 
on the recorded deeds, and may thereby defeat the Massey tax deed claims. 
3. QUIT CLAIM DEEDS. 
The Court concludes that a quit claim deed conveys everything that the grantor possessed and 
even though a quit claim deed may have been recorded after a tax deed, it may have priority over the 
tax deed if the property meets the standards set forth above in the two preceding paragraphs. 
4. THE M A S S E Y W E B E R COUNTY TAX DEEDS. 
If Weber County issues tax deeds on property upon which the taxes have always been paid 
on record title and which boundaries have been changed from the recorded title by the concept of 
boundaries by acquiescence, then those tax deeds on such property are null and void as to any person 
now holding an otherwise legitimate title by recorded conveyance, including the modified boundary 
by acquiescence. 
5. NONINCLUDED PROPERTY. 
In the event the Massey tax deeds include property upon which the taxes were not paid as 
described above, or pursuant to other legitimate rules regarding assessments and levy for taxes OR 
property that is not included in the recorded deeded property as modified through the boundary 
established by acquiescence and Weber County did properly assess and then sell at the Massey tax 
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Si sales, this other property the Court finds is 'nonincluded' property pursuant to the foregoing legal 
«, conclusions, then it would appear that Massey's would be entitled to a clear title to such property 
H \ 
ft-1 
which might be included in their tax deeds (noting the exclusion of the Questar property.). 
The Court is aware that there may be problems with corner markers, topographical surveys, 
and perhaps the Gilgen survey in this case. If adjoining parties have historically accepted certain land 
boundaries that are different than actual surveys and recorded deeds, those boundary lines accepted 
and acknowledged over many years will prevail over actual surveys or topographical overlays. 
Additionally, as stated above, the tax deeds will not be given priority over conveyances before and 
after issuance of the tax deeds, provided the conditions outlined above by the Court are met. 
In summary, for Massey to prevail herein, they must show the property they are claiming did 
not have taxes assessed and paid and was different land than taxes were paid on and this also prohibits 
the Massey's tax deeds from disturbing boundaries established by acquiescence. On the other hand, 
if Massey's bought other property which was assessed and taxes were not paid, their claim would be 
valid as to that property. The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that the tax deeds should be given 
such validity as to extinguish the claims of the subsequent title holders to the property described by 
the Court above. The conclusions apply to the conditions stated by the Court and uncontroverted 
facts of this case and on the legal concept that unless Weber County had a proper legal basis to issue 
their tax deeds they are void ab initio as to that land improperly sold. 
The Court orders that for trial, the parties stipulate to all tax receipts that are not actually in 
controversy, and all other official records as such. All other admissible exhibits and documents must 
be stipulated to for admissibility though weight of all evidence will of course remain with the Court. 
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Each party should make every effort to complete stipulations and clearly identify all final exhibits at 
least one week prior to trial. Any objections to any particular exhibits must be forwarded to the 
Court with the written objection in detail on or before February 26, 2004. Not more than a three (3) 
page trial brief shall be submitted by each party at least one week prior to trial on or before Tuesday, 
February 24, 2004. Trial is scheduled to start Wednesday, March 3, 2004 at nine o'clock. 
DATED this / day of February, 2004. 
ROGER $(DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum to the 
following parties by first class mail, postage prepaid, this HI day of February, 2004: 
FRANK S. WARNER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3544 Lincoln Avenue, Suite F 
Ogden,UT 84401 
M. DARIN HAMMOND 
Attorney for Defendant's 
Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars, 
and Adele B. Lewis 
4723 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendant's 
Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, L.L.C and 
12X12,L.L.C. 
3098 Highland Drive #450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, LLC and 12 X 12, L.L.C. 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
H.C. MASSEY; and BETTY P. MASSEY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
KENNETH A. GRIFFITHS; BKB LLC; ] 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY; WILSON ] 
IRRIGATION CO.; AARON B. BUTTARS;; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; ADELE B. 
LEWIS; FRANCES E. HANKS; KMEL P. ; 
FISHER; and JOHN DOES 1 through 100, ; 
Defendants. ] 
> FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 960900027 • 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Ui m \) U: US 
960900027 BKB 
Tab 3 
? 12 X 12, L.L.C., a Limited Liability 
* Company; 
55 Third-Party Plaintiff, 
K 
vs. 
H.C. MASSEY; BETTY P. MASSEY; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY, a 
Corporation; AARON B. BUTTARS; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; and ADELE B. 
LEWIS, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled cause came on regularly before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
for a Final Pretrial Telephone Conference on February 24, 2004 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiffs 
appearing by and through their counsel Frank S. Warner, the defendants Kenneth A. 
Griffiths and BKB LLC, and third-party plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C., appearing by and 
through their counsel Ray G. Martineau and Douglas L. S to well, the defendants Aaron B. 
Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis appearing by and through their counsel M. 
Darin Hammond, and the Court having previously approved and signed its Order Of 
Dismissal As To The Defendant Wilson Irrigation Company Only, dated February 19, 
2003, and the Stipulation, Order, And Judgment Of Dismissal With Prejudice Of Plaintiffs' 
Claims Against Questar Gas Company, dated October 9, 2003, and the named defendants 
Frances E. Hanks and Kimel P. Fisher not having been served with process or having 
entered any appearance herein and the Court having heretofore issued its Ruling 
Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2004, and the Court having 
U3 
j ; heard and carefully considered the statements and arguments of counsel, including the 
S statement by plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs "concede that the property in question that 
,/j we claim under the tax deeds has historically been occupied by the defendants and their 
\ 
in 
predecessors in interest, together with the Questar Gas property and their predecessors in 
interest • • • for at least 20 years," and that the "defendants and their predecessors in interest 
have paid taxes on the tax notices that were issued to them by the County", and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor hereby makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about September 10, 1993 Frances B. Hanks, as the then owner and 
holder of the record, legal and equitable title to the following described real property 
("Griffiths Property") located in Weber County, State of Utah, conveyed the same to the 
defendant Kenneth A. Griffiths ("Griffiths") by Warranty Deed dated September 10, 1993, 
which Warranty Deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber County 
Recorder on September 23, 1993 in Book 1681 at Pages 1038 and 1039 as Entry No. 
1248223: 
15-063-0035 and 15-062-0036: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
being West 942.09 feet and South 286.17 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 201.72 feet, 
thence West 863.79 feet to the East line of the Willard Canal right-of-way; 
thence Northwesterly along said East line along the arc of a 495 foot radius 
curve to the right a distance of 210.22 feet, the long chord of which bears 
North 15°20'47" West 209.21 feet; thence East 929.15 feet to the point of 
beginning. Excepting therefrom the Street on the East. 
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J 15-063-0037 and 15-063-0038: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
f! Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
8 Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
| being West 942.09 feet and South 487.89 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
p of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 157 feet; 
\ thence West along a fence 183 feet; thence South along a fence 40 feet; 
thence West along a fence 202 feet; thence South along a fence 289.80 feet 
in the East line of the Willard Canal right of way; thence Northwesterly 
along said East line as follows: North 45°01' West 559.61 feet to the point 
of a curve; thence along the arc of a 495 foot radius curve to the right a 
distance of 150.93 feet, the long chord of which bears North 36°16,53,> 
West 150.35 feet; thence East 269.79 feet to the point of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom the street on the East. 
2. On or about January 24, 1994 Kenneth A. Griffiths, as the then owner and 
holder of the record, legal and equitable title to the Griffiths Property conveyed the same to 
the defendant BKB LLC, a Utah limited liability company ("BKB"), by Warranty Deed 
dated January 24, 1994, which Warranty Deed was subsequently recorded in the office of 
the Weber County Recorder on January 24, 1994 in Book 1699 at Pages 1947 and 1948 as 
Entry No. 1270446. 
3. On or about October 26, 2000 BKB LLC, as the then owner and holder of 
the record, legal and equitable title to the Griffiths Property conveyed the same to the third-
party plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("12 X 12"), by Quit 
Claim Deed dated October 26, 2000, which Quit Claim Deed was recorded in the office of 
the Weber County Recorder on November 1, 2000 in Book 2099 at Pages 1904-1906 as 
Entry No. 1735201. 
4. 12 X 12 and each of its predecessors in interest in and to the Griffiths 
Property have timely paid and discharged all real property taxes that have been levied upon 
4 
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^ the Griffiths Property during and throughout a period of more than 20 years immediately 
w 
•H preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. 
? 
£ 5. On or about February 26, 1953 Kenneth H. De Vries and Ruth Carver De 
Vries, as the then owners and holders of the record, legal and equitable title to the 
following described real property ("Buttars Property") located in Weber County, State of 
Utah, conveyed the same to James H. Lewis and the defendant Adele B. Lewis, as joint 
tenants, by Warranty Deed dated February 26, 1953, which Warranty Deed was 
subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber County Recorder on June 26, 1962 in 
Book 714 at Page 232 as Entry No. 382225: 
A part of the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 24; in 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey, 
in Weber County, State of Utah; Beginning at a point 20 chains sough and 
14.58 chains west of the northeast corner of said quarter section; thence 
west 5.44 chains; thence north 754 chains; thence east 5.44 chains; thence 
south llA chains to the place of beginning, containing 4!4 acres, more or 
less. 
6. On or about June 23, 1962 Wesley De Vries and Phyllis De Vries, executed 
and delivered a certain Quit Claim Deed covering the Buttars Property to James H. Lewis 
and the defendant Adele B. Lewis, as joint tenants, which Quit Claim Deed was 
subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber County Recorder on June 26, 1962 in 
Book 714 at Page 233 as Entry No. 382226. 
7. On or about December 5, 1994 the defendant Adele B. Lewis, as the then 
owner and holder of the record, legal and equitable title to the Buttars Property (her 
husband and joint tenant having theretofore died) conveyed the same to the defendants 
Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars ("the Buttars") by Warranty Deed dated December 
5 988 
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5, 1994, which Warranty Deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the Weber 
County Recorder on December 5,1994 in Book 1740 at Page 912 as Entry No. 1324178. 
In 8. The Buttars and each of their predecessors in interest in and to the Buttars 
Property have timely paid and discharged all real property taxes that have been levied upon 
the Buttars Property during and throughout a period of more than 20 years immediately 
preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. 
9. The boundaries between the Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the 
Questar Gas property have been clearly marked and identified, as they are now, by long 
established fence lines, which fence lines have been recognized and acquiesced in by the 
respective owners of the Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the Questar Gas 
property as the actual boundaries between their respective properties, for a period of not 
less than twenty continuous years immediately preceding the initiation of the above-
entitled action. 
10. On or about June 12, 1986 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ("Tax Deed No. 
1") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder on June 13, 1986 in Book A-8 at Page 397 as Entry No. 971917: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE MERIDIAN, U.S. 
SURVEY: BEGINNING 20 CHAINS EAST, AND 737.89 FEET SOUTH 
OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID QUARTER SECTION: 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 47.11 FEET: THENCE EAST 377 FEET 
MORE OR LESS TO A POINT WEST 942.09 FEET FROM THE EAST 
LINE OF SAID QUARTER SECTION: THENCE NORTH 47.11 FEET; 
6 8 
£ THENCE WEST 377. FEET, MORE OR LESS TO THE POINT OF 
J BEGINNING. 
§ 11. On or about June 12, 1986 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
v» 
J; County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ("Tax Deed No. 
2") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder on June 13,1986 in Book A-8 at Page 398 as Entry No. 97198: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, U.S. 
SURVEY: BEGINNING AT A POINT 1291.37 FEET WEST AND 
1040.37 FEET SOUTH OF THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SAID 
SECTION 24: THENCE NORTH 325.49 FEET; THENCE WEST 35.71 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH289.80 FEET: THENCE SOUTH 45D01' EAST 
50.49 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
12. On or about June 8, 1992 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ("Tax Deed No. 
3") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder in Book 1629 at Page 700 as Entry No. 1181275: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, U.S. 
SURVEY: BEGINNING 20 CHAINS EAST AND 785 FEET SOUTH OF 
THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID QUARTER SECTION, 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 40 FEET; THENCE EAST 176.04 FEET, 
THENCE NORTH 40 FEET, THENCE EAST 150 FEET, THENCE 
SOUTH 40 FEET, THENCE EAST TO A POINT WEST 942.09 FEET 
FROM THE EAST LINE OF SAID QUARTER SECTION, THENCE 
NORTH 40 FEET, THENCE WEST 377 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
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JJ 13. On or about June 8, 1992 Weber County, acting by and through the Weber 
ijv) 
* County Auditor, executed and delivered to plaintiffs that certain Tax Deed ('Tax Deed No. 
w 4") purporting thereby to convey to plaintiffs the following described real property located 
w \ 
in Weber County, State of Utah, which deed was subsequently recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder in Book 1629 at Page 702 as Entry No. 1181277: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 
6 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN: BEGINNING 20 
CHAINS EAST 714.89 FEET SOUTH OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER 
OF SAID QUARTER SECTION; RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 23 FEET; 
THENCE EAST 377 FEET; THENCE NORTH 63 FEET; THENCE WEST 
183 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 40 FEET; THENCE WEST 194.91 FEET 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
14. A cursory inspection by the Weber County Assessor or the plaintiffs of the 
Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the Questar Gas property would readily and 
clearly have disclosed that the boundaries of and between the same were clearly marked 
and identified by long established fence lines and that the same had been occupied by the 
owners of said properties over an extended period of time. 
15. E. Paul Gilgen, a former Weber County Surveyor, prepared a survey of the 
real property, of which the Griffiths Property, the Buttars Property and the Questar Gas 
property are now a part, dated October 22, 1963, which survey accurately shows the 
location of the boundary lines as they now exist, between the Griffiths Property, the 
Buttars Property and the Questar Gas property. 
16. The root of the title to the legal descriptions that are set forth in Tax Deed 
No. 1, Tax Deed No. 2, Tax Deed No. 3 and Tax Deed No. 4 ("Tax Deeds") is a Quit 
8 
ft Claim Deed, dated September 25, 1979, that purports to convey the real property described 
to 
2 therein, to which property the grantor named therein held no title or interest. 
£ 17. None of the legal descriptions set forth in the Tax Deeds cover any real 
property that the defendants, 12X12, and their respective predecessors in interest have not 
occupied, possessed and paid taxes on as above stated for a continuous period of not less 
than 20 years immediately preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. 
18. None of the legal descriptions that are set forth in the Tax Deeds cover any 
real property that the defendants and their predecessors in interest have not possessed, 
occupied and paid taxes on as above stated. 
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court's findings and ruling set forth in the Court's Ruling 
Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2004 are by this reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
2. The defendants Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB LLC, Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda 
L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis, and the third-party plaintiff 12 X 12, and each of them, are 
entitled to the entry of an order herein dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims herein with 
prejudice and upon the merits and awarding plaintiffs nothing thereby. 
3. The defendant 12 X 12, is entitled to the entry of an order herein quieting 
the title to the Griffiths Property, including all portions thereof heretofore occupied by the 
defendant 12 X 12 and its predecessors in interest up to and including the present 
boundaries thereof, in 12 X 12, free and clear of any and all claims, rights, titles, interests 
St 
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and estates of every kind and description therein and thereto of plaintiffs and any other 
* party hereto. 
4. The defendants Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis are 
entitled to the entry of judgment herein quieting the title to the Buttars Property, including 
any and all portions thereof heretofore occupied by the Buttars and their predecessors in 
interest, in the Buttars, free and clear of any and all claims, rights, titles, interests and 
estates of every kind and description therein and thereto of plaintiffs and any other party 
hereto. 
5. Tax Deed No. 1, Tax Deed No. 2, Tax Deed No. 3 and Tax Deed No. 4 are 
invalid and of no force and effect as such relate to the parties in this action. 
6. The defendants and 12 X 12 are entitled to be awarded their respective costs 
of court and disbursements pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(d), URCP. 
DATED this J2^?day of ApriJ/2004. 
RogerS. 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Findings Of 
Fact And Conclusions Of Law was served upon the following individuals, and by mailing 
a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to each of said individuals at the addresses shown below, 
this 9J_ day of April, 2004. 
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OGDEN, UTAH FEBRUARY 24, 2004 
THE COURT: HI. 
THE CLERK: HI. I'VE GOT FRANK WARNER, DOUG STOWELL, 
RAY MARTINEAU, AND DARIN HAMMOND ON THE PHONE. AND THIS WAS 
ON BECAUSE I THINK WE WERE — WE HAD A JURY TRIAL CONFIRMED 
FOR FRIDAY, AND WE WERE GONNA CUT THEIR TRIAL SHORT. BUT 
THERE'S A MOTION TO CONTINUE ON THAT TRIAL FRIDAY, SO — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
THE CLERK: OKAY. HOLD ON. 
OKAY. I'VE GOT JUDGE DUTSON ON THE LINE. 
THE COURT: GOOD MORNING. 
MR. WARNER: GOOD MORNING, JUDGE. THIS IS FRANK WARNER. 
MR. MARTINEAU: AND, JUDGE, THIS IS RAY MARTINEAU. 
MR. STOWELL: DOUG STOWELL, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. HAMMOND: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: EXCUSE ME, I DIDN'T GET THAT LAST ONE? 
MR. STOWELL: I'M SORRY, DOUG STOWELL, ALSO ON THE LINE, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. HAMMOND: AND DARIN HAMMOND. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NOW, I ASSUME ALL OF YOU HAVE 
GOTTEN MY LATEST RULING? 
MR. WARNER: YES. 
MR. MARTINEAU: WE DID. 
THE COURT: AND I WOULD ASSUME THIS IS GOING TO PERHAPS 
3 
1| EXPEDITE SOME OF THE TRIAL TIME, BUT PERHAPS, YOU KNOW, I'M 
£| MISTAKEN, I DON'T KNOW. MR. WARNER, WHAT'S YOUR TAKE ON 
3f WHERE — WHERE YOU'RE GOING TO BE GOING NOW WITH THIS RULING? 
t>t MR. WARNER: WELL, I -- I THINK YOUR RULING'S GOING TO 
EXPEDITE THINGS TREMENDOUSLY, NOT ~ NOT TO MY SATISFACTION, 
i I DARE SAY — 
fl THE COURT: RIGHT, I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
MR. WARNER: BUT IT SEEMS TO ME, IN FACT, AS I'VE BEEN 
THINKING ABOUT THIS AND EVEN THINKING ABOUT IT MORE THROUGH 
THE NIGHT THAT WHAT YOU'VE DONE IS YOU'VE — YOUR RULING IS 
CALLED A CONDITIONAL DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
AND AS I READ — 
MR. MARTINEAU: FRANK, I'M HAVING A LITTLE TROUBLE 
HEARING YOU. COULD YOU SPEAK UP A LITTLE? 
f$i MR. WARNER: YOUR MOTION IS CALLED A CONDITIONAL DENIAL 
i£| OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND AS I ANALYZE IT, PERHAPS THE ONLY 
1*71 REASON IT IS CONDITIONAL IS BECAUSE OF MY OBJECTIONS, 
3.81 SOMEWHAT OF A TECHNICAL NATURE CONCERNING THE HEARSAY NATURE 
19 OF SOME OF THE EXHIBITS AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF SOME OF THE 
201 EXHIBITS SUPPORTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
211 LET ME SAY, YOUR HONOR, THAT I DO NOT HAVE ANY EVIDENCE 
22 THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT PAID TAXES ON 
231 THE TAX NOTICES THAT HAVE BEEN SENT TO THEM OVER THE YEARS, 
241 NOR DO I HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS ANY PARCEL OF 
25 PROPERTY AT ISSUE HERE THAT HASN'T BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE 
4 
PENDANTS OVER THE YEARS. AND THOSE SEEM TO BE THE TWO — 
1HE COURT: RIGHT — 
MR. WARNER: -- AREAS LEFT OPEN IN YOUR — IN YOUR 
JUDGMENT. SO I'M ALMOST -- ALTHOUGH I'D LIKE TO ARGUE THIS 
FOREVER, I'M ALMOST WONDERING IF — IF WE ADMIT AND STIPULATE 
THOSE FACTS, IF — IF YOU'RE NOT PREPARED TO RULE ON THIS 
\TTER. 
THE COURT: WELL, I — I WAS CONCERNED AND AM CONCERNED 
AS TO EXACTLY WHERE THERE MIGHT BE ANY PROPERTY THAT WAS NOT 
COVERED BY WHAT YOU'VE JUST RELATED. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE 
TAX DEEDS INCLUDED SOME PROPERTY THAT WAS IN A — IN AN AREA 
THAT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN WHAT THE PARTIES WERE CLAIMING — 
SEE, I DIDN'T -- I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING FOR CERTAIN THAT 
THAT'S THE CASE BASED ON WHAT'S BEFORE ME. AND SO IF WHAT 
YOU'RE SAYING IS EVERYTHING IS INCLUDED WITHIN THE PROPERTY 
THAT THEY HAVE OCCUPIED, THEN I THINK YOU'RE RIGHT. 
MR. WARNER: WELL, IT'S CERTAINLY A FACT. I MEAN, I ~ 
WE CAN'T DISPUTE THAT. WHAT WE CLAIM — WHAT WE'RE CLAIMING 
IS EITHER OCCUPIED WAS ORIGINALLY OCCUPIED BY MOUNTAIN FUEL 
OR QUESTAR AS TO THAT PARCEL, AND THEN THE OTHER TWO 
DEFENDANTS ON THE NORTH — 
THE COURT: EVERYTHING IS INCLUDED IN IT THEN. 
MR. WARNER: SO FAR AS OCCUPATION LINES ARE CONCERNED, 
YES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, THEN, THAT DOES SEEM TO BRING 
i l O A HEAD. 
MR. WARNER: THE — THE ONLY ISSUES THAT REALLY HAVEN'T 
MSN DECIDED AND IN THE — IN VIEW OF — IF THAT'S THE WAY 
Ht^'RE GOING TO RULE, IT'S PROBABLY MOOT AT THIS POINT. THE 
H&Y ISSUE THAT HASN'T BEEN DECIDED WOULD BE WHERE EXACTLY 
fHOSE TAX DEEDS LIE, HOW MUCH OF EACH DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY 
fBEY COVER, AND I THINK THERE'S SOME DISPUTE — I THINK THERE 
j£}Y BE SOME DISPUTE ON THAT. MY EXPERT HAS PRESENTED AND 
fe*VE PRESENTED IN VARIOUS MOTIONS TO THE COURT A COPY OF HER 
PURVEY. THE DEFENDANT'S ARE WELL AWARE OF IT, BUT I THINK 
$feEY — I THINK AT LEAST MR. MARTINEAU'S CLIENTS DISPUTE 
WHAT. BUT THAT ALL SEEMS TO BE MOOT AT THIS POINT IF — IF 
$fOUR HONOR'S — 
THE COURT: WELL, IF EVERYTHING CLOSES, YES, I THINK SO. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOU MEAN IF THE DEED CLOSES -r-
THE COURT: ANYBODY HAVE A DIFFERENT READ ON THIS? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOUR HONOR, WHEN YOU SAY IF 
EVERYTHING CLOSES, ARE YOU REFERRING TO THE LEGAL 
DESCRIPTIONS IN THE DEEDS? 
THE COURT: NO. I'M TALKING ABOUT CLOSING THE -- THE 
BOUNDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE — 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: — AS WELL AS LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS. YOU KNOW, 
IF — IF THEY DON'T CLOSE BY LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS BUT THEY DO 
BY BOUNDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE, THEN I DO THINK MR. WARNER IS 
CORRECT IN — IN INTERPRETING WHAT I HAVE RULED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE RECORD HEREIN 
ESTABLISHES THAT VERY CLEARLY, THAT EITHER — THAT WHAT IS IN 
POSSESSION AND TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID ON INCLUDES NOT ONLY WHAT 
IS IN THE DEEDS, BUT ALSO WHAT HAS BEEN OCCUPIED TO GIVE US A 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CLAIM. I THINK THAT APPLIES BOTH 
TO — WITH REGARD TO THE GRIFFITHS' INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE 
GUTTERS. 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT — THAT VERY WELL MAY BE. I — 
AS I'VE STATED, IN LOOKING AT MS. SEGRIFF'S DIAGRAM, IT'S A 
jLITTLE HARD FOR ME BECAUSE I — I CANNOT REALLY TELL WHICH OF 
3"HE TAX DEEDS COVERS WHAT. I JUST HAVE THE TOTALITY I THINK 
OF THE TAX DEEDS SHOWN IN THERE. ISN'T THAT CORRECT, 
MR. WARNER? 
MR. WARNER: ACTUALLY, THEY'RE — THEY'RE PLOTTED 
INDIVIDUALLY THERE, BUT I -- I CONCEDE THAT THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN THEM ARE HARD TO SEE. THEY — THEY DO — THEY DO — 
THE FOUR OF THEM TOGETHER DO CLOSE AS ONE UNIT — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: — AND HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ASSIGNED ONE 
TAX NUMBER BY THE COUNTY. 
THE COURT: HAVE THEY? OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THEN IF THE 
FACTS AREN'T IN CONTROVERSY, I THINK MY RULING WOULD RESOLVE 
THIS MATTER. 
MR. WARNER: BUT WHAT I'M CONCERNED ABOUT, YOUR HONOR, 
THAT WE HAVE A GOOD CLEAN RECORD. I OWE MY CLIENT THAT 
as 
THE COURT: CERTAINLY. 
MR. WARNER: — (UNINTELLIGIBLE) REASON, AND SO I — 
JR*- MY ONLY QUESTION --
THE COURT: WELL, SHOULD WE --
MR. WARNER: — IS HOW WE GET FROM HERE TO A — A 
GECORD, AND I JUST — IF I MAY SUGGEST THIS, PERHAPS — 
LIEHAPS IT AMOUNTS TO YOUR ISSUING AN ADDITIONAL RULING — 
HOW THE OTHER PARTIES FEEL ABOUT THIS, BUT JUST ISSUING 
ADDITIONAL RULING ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IN THIS TELEPHONE 
INFERENCE, THE PLAINTIFF CONCEDED THOSE PARTICULAR FACTS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: THAT MAKE SENSE? 
THE COURT: THAT MAY VERY WELL THEN CLARIFY EVERYTHING, 
DOES ANYONE SEE A PROBLEM WITH THAT? 
MR. MARTINEAU: WE DON'T, YOUR HONOR. WHAT I WOULD 
LIKE, I THINK WHERE IT IS MR. WARNER'S BURDEN, IF HE WOULD 
COME UP WITH A STIPULATION TO THAT EFFECT AND LET US, MYSELF, 
STOWELL, AND DARIN HAMMOND, LOOK AT THAT AND SEE IF WE CAN'T 
SIGN A STIPULATION THAT PUTS THAT AT REST. 
THE COURT: AS FAR AS FACTS ARE CONCERNED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES. 
THE COURT: YES. AND THEN I'LL GO AHEAD WITH MY FINAL 
RULING ON THE LEGAL QUESTIONS. 
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I, WE HAVE A TRIAL SCHEDULED ~ 
HR. .MARTINEAU: NEXT WEDNESDAY. 
$g£ COURT: -- NEXT WEDNESDAY, AND I'D CERTAINLY LIKE TO 
HAVE THIS WRAPPED UP THIS WEEK THEN OR WE CO — WE 
HAVE TO HAVE A HEARING TO FINALIZE IT ON THE RECORD ON 
SDAY, AND THAT WOULD BE JUST ADDITION EXPENSE FOR EACH 
tYQQR CLIENTS. HOW DO YOU WANNA DO THIS, MR. WARNER? 
MR. WARNER: WELL, THAT'S ~ THAT'S EXACTLY WHY I, 
m — AFTER CONSIDERING YOUR RULING, AM PREPARED TO MAKE 
CONCESSIONS I AM. THAT IS — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WARNER: — BECAUSE I DON'T SEE THE POINT IN THE 
ISDITIONAL EXPENSES FOR MY CLIENTS OR THE OTHER PARTIES' 
BWENTS AND — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN — 
MR. WARNER: -- BUT IT STILL SEEMS TO ME, YOUR HONOR, 
MAT IT ISN'T EVEN NECESSARY THAT WE ENTER INTO A WRITTEN 
STIPULATION; THAT YOU COULD SIMPLY RECITE IN YOUR RULING 
£HAT -- THAT WE CONCEDED AS TO THOSE FACTS. 
MR. MARTINEAU: WELL, I THINK THERE OUGHTA BE 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
MR. WARNER: THERE ARE ONLY TWO FACTS ~ 
MR. MARTINEAU: — FACTS, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: WELL, MR. WARNER, IF YOU'LL JUST PUT ON THE 
RECORD VERY CLEARLY RIGHT NOW THEN WHAT YOU ARE CONCEDING. 
•HflS BEING RECORDED AND IT WILL BE A GOOD RECORD OF THAT, 
£#*££££ WITH YOU, THEN YOU WOULDN'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING MORE. 
II*1*BOS'T YOU GO — 
MR. MARTINEAU: THAT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. 
SHE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU GO AHEAD AND STATE THEN 
•Uft&Y WHAT YOUR STIPULATION IS. 
MR. WARNER: WELL, I -- WE — WE CONCEDE THAT THE 
QWERTY IN QUESTION THAT WE CLAIM UNDER THE TAX DEEDS HAS 
UprGBICALLY BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR 
HiteftECESSORS IN INTEREST TOGETHER WITH THE — THE QUESTAR GAS 
HDPERTY AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST. IT'S ONE OF THE 
E PARTIES HAVE OCCUPIED ALL OF THAT PROPERTY WHICH WE ARE 
iyklMING UNDER OUR TAX DEEDS. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS? 
MR. WARNER: FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: AND DO YOU CONCEDE THAT THE 
BBFENDANTS PAID TAXES ON ALL THOSE PROPERTIES? 
MR. WARNER: WELL, I CONCEDE THAT THERE'S AN ISSUE AS TO 
IJHAT THEY PAID TAXES ON, BUT I THINK THE COURT HAS VERY -•-
VERY CLEARLY SEEN OUR POSITION ON THAT, AND THAT IS, THE 
TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID ON LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS WHICH DON'T 
HECESSARILY MEET AND CLOSE, AND THERE ARE — 
THE COURT: RIGHT, RIGHT. 
MR. WARNER: — BUT IN — BUT THE COURT'S RULING GOES 
BEYOND THAT AND SAYS THAT THAT ISN'T NECESSARY, THAT SO LONG 
10 
Stf* 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS THERE, THAT SOLVES THAT 
FROM THE COURT'S POINT OF VIEW IN THIS RULING. 
tSE COURT: OKAY. THAT -- YEAH, I DON'T THINK THAT 
$KMtNER CAN CONCEDE THAT THE TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID ON ALL 
IgOPERTY IN THE LE ~ OR — OR BEYOND THAT PROPERTY WHICH 
EXCEED OR BE DIFFERENT THAN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS. 
MR. WARNER: THAT'S — THAT'S PRECISELY OUR POINT, 
ONIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: WE'RE — WE'RE MERELY ASKING THAT 
sClOHCEDE THAT — THAT ALL THE DEFENDANTS PAID TAXES ON THE 
LS THAT THEY WERE ISSUED BILLS ON. 
MR. WARNER: I WOULD CONCEDE THAT THEY HAVE PAID TAXES 
J.THE TAX NOTICES THAT WERE ISSUED TO THEM BY THE COUNTY. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: AND --
THE COURT: VERY WELL. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- AND YOU'RE ALSO CONCEDING, 
K, THAT THE BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS KIND OF A OF 
E-UP CALL FOR ANY — ANY CHALLENGE TO ANY -- ANY 
IE 
SCRIPTION IN ALL OF THE PROPERTY THAT WE'RE DEALING WITH 
jKERE. 
MR. WARNER: I THINK THAT WAS THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
THE COURT: HE DOESN'T CONCEDE THAT, BUT THE COURT'S 
RULED THAT. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: OKAY. 
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£ MR. WARNER: THAT'S A LEGAL ISSUE I THINK THAT THE COURT 
HOLED AGAINST US ON. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. NOW, I HAVE ONE QUESTION NOW THAT 
3 IS ON THE RECORD: HOW DID THESE TAX DEEDS EVER GET 
TED9 JUST -- WAS THERE — WAS THERE A REVIEW BY THE 
y SURVEYOR'S OFFICE THAT SAW THE DISCREPANCY IN THE — 
LEGAL — RECORDED LEGAL DESCRIPTION AND JUST DID THIS IN 
OFFICE THEN OR WHAT ~ WHAT HAPPENED? 
MB. MARTINEAU- THERE WAS NEVER ANY REVIEW BY THE COUNTY 
;VEYOR'S OFFICE. THIS ALL WAS GENERATED AND CAME OUT OF 
ASSESSOR'S OFFICE — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
* MB. MARTINEAU: — BASED --
THE COURT: SO THEY JUST DID IT IN THE OFFICE BASED ON 
THE --
MB. MARTINEAU: BASED — 
THE COURT: -- BOUNDARIES CLOSED — 
MB- MARTINEAU: BASED (UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
THE COURT: -- ON THE RECORDED DEEDS-
MB- MARTINEAU: IT WAS BASED ON A STRAY DEED BACK IN THE 
RECORD TITLE, AND THAT'S HOW THAT CAME ABOUT. 
MR. WARNER: YEAH, I DON'T NECESSARILY AGREE WITH THAT. 
LET — LET ME TELL YOU WHAT MY VIEW OF IT IS, YOUR HONOR, AND 
I DIDN'T REALLY INTEND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THIS BECAUSE I 
DIDN'T THINK (UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
\ 
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m fSE COURT: WELL, NO, I THINK IT'S MORE A MATTER OF 
JITY TO THE COURT THAN ANYTHING RIGHT NOW. 
f{ MR. WARNER: I — I'VE SPOKE WITH SOME PEOPLE OF — FROM 
ASSESSOR'S OFFICE THAT THERE WERE HISTORICALLY, AND 
NTLY WHAT HAPPENS IS THE COUNTY RECORDER RECORDS THESE 
t AND THEY ARE OBLIGATED TO FURNISH THE LEGAL 
PTIONS TO THE COUNTY ASSESSOR FOR TAX PURPOSES. THAT'S 
w* 
— THAT'S WHERE THIS ALL ORIGINATES UNDER UTAH LAW. 
— AND WHAT HAPPENED BACK AT SOME POINT IN TIME IS, IS 
|f WHEN THESE DESCRIPTIONS DIDN'T MATCH UP ON THE COUNTY'S 
k 
CT ONE-MILE SQUARE GRID THAT THEY USE FOR EVERY SECTION 
'0B£ COUNTY, IT WOULD — IT WOULD LEAVE GAPS SOMETIMES IN 
MIDDLE, AND SO THEY WOULD -- THE COUNTY RECORDER WOULD — 
ISSUE COPIES OF — OR LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS ON THESE GAPS, 
£ -- IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS TO THE COUNTY ASSESSOR. 
THE COUNTY ASSESSOR STARTED TAXING THESE AND THEY CALL 
REMAINING PARCELS. THE TERM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: WHEN DID THAT START? «'
J
 MR. WARNER: APPARENTLY IT'S A PRACTICE THAT HAS — HAS Si ' if; 
«? 
GOING ON FOR SOME TIME AND -- AND THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF 
JE ISSUED. IT STARTED --I'M NOT SURE THE EXACT DATE. OF 
FRSE PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THESE DEEDS. 
tip MR. MARTINEAU: THESE GAPS ARE BASED UPON A STRAY DEED 
ft**/**'
 IN T H E RECORD TITLE. 
h MR. WARNER: WELL, MR. MARTINEAU (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
M \ 
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THE COURT: WELL (UNINTELLIGIBLE) GENERATED -- THAT WAS 
I PROBABLY A DEED GENERATED BY THE ASSESSOR'S OFFICE OR THE 
| RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
MR. WARNER: MY VIEW IS, IS THAT STRAY DEED, THERE IS A 
DEED THERE AND IT'S — IT — IT ISN'T IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE, 
| 1 ADMIT THAT. WAS -- WAS EITHER GENERATED, AS YOU SUGGEST, 
I YOUR HONOR, OR IT WAS GENERATED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES 
RECOGNIZING --
MR. MARTINEAU: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. WARNER: — THAT THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
MR. MARTINEAU: IT WAS MISTAKENLY GENERATED BY ONE OF 
I tHE PARTIES WAY BACK, AND IT'S — IT'S NOT IN THE CHAIN OF 
LflTLE, BUT IT'S IN THE RECORD TITLE, AND THAT'S WHERE THIS 
| $HA COMES FROM. 
I MR. WARNER: YEAH, BUT --
I THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
I MR. WARNER: BUT A LOT OF THESE REMAINING PARCELS DIDN'T 
I IJSWE THOSE KIND OF DEEDS TO BACK 'EM UP THAT THIS 
I UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
I THE COURT: WELL, NOW, THERE'S ONE OTHER FACTOR HERE, 
I SJI&?HOUGH THE COUNTY ISN'T BROUGHT INTO THIS, THE MASSEYS PAID 
I 'i$mZ MONEY TO THE COUNTY FOR THIS, AND THEY GOT NOTHING, 
I jty)D — 
I MR. WARNER: WELL, AND THEY CONTINUED TO PAY TAXES ON IT 
I ^ I N T E L L I G I B L E ) — 
MM* 
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THE COURT: WHAT? 
MR. WARNER: THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO PAY TAXES ON IT 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: AND THEY'VE CONTINUED --
MR. MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, THAT GOES WITH THE TAX DEED. 
THEY GET WHATEVER THE — THE COUNTY HAD, WHICH IF THEY HAD 
NOTHING, THEY GET NOTHING. 
THE COURT: WELL, BUT THEN IF THERE WAS NOTHING THERE, 
["THEY PROBABLY ARE ENTITLED TO A REFUND. BUT I DON'T — 
| THEY'RE NOT BROUGHT INTO THIS ONE, SO I GUESS WE DON'T NEED 
I'TO WORRY ABOUT THAT. 
h MR. WARNER: THERE'S — THERE IS A PROVISION IN STATE 
B ^ 
i- ** 
f^ LAW WHICH SAYS THAT IN THE EVENT -- IN THE EVENT THE TAX DEED 
JS FOUND TO BE INVALID, THAT THE GRANTEE OF THE TAX DEED 
P&iALL HAVE A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY WHICH SHALL BE FORECLOSED 
IN THE SAME PROCEEDING AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE INVALIDITY 
^OF THE TAX DEED. AND I THINK I HAVE THAT IN MY OTHER ROOM 
7 
^XHERE SITTING ON TABLE. A LAW I JUST RAN ACROSS THE OTHER 
p 
J^ J&Y, AND IT'S AN ISSUE I'D LIKE TO HOLD OPEN IN THIS 
lli&TTER --
.„ THE COURT: NOT AGAINST THESE PARTIES, BUT THE COUNTY. 
|^ MR. WARNER: WELL, IT SAYS A LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTY, 
% > — 
THE COURT: WELL, IF IT SAYS A LIEN AGAINST THE 
KsjBOPERTY, THEN THAT WOULD BE EXTINGUISHED UNDER MY RULING, 
I 
I**
% 
I 
15 
HOWEVER — 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YES, ABSOLUTELY. 
MR. WARNER: IT WOULD — 
MR. MARTINEAU: ABSOLUTELY. THIS — THIS IS NO TIME TO 
RAISE THAT ISSUE AT ALL. 
THE COURT: WELL, IT — IT VERY WELL IS THE TIME TO 
'RAISE IT IF IT'S GOING TO BE RAISED BECAUSE IT NEEDS TO BE 
RESOLVED IF IT'S GOING TO BE RAISED. 
MR. WARNER: MAY I FURNISH THE COURT AND THE PARTIES A 
'CITATION TO THAT FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH AND PERHAPS — 
; THE COURT: WELL, I — I WOULD APPRECIATE THAT, AND THEN 
•WHEN I ISSUE MY FINAL RULING IN NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS, I WILL 
ADDRESS THAT ISSUE AS IT RELATES TO THESE PARTIES. 
MR. WARNER: I'LL FURNISH A COPY OF THAT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED 
mO DISCUSS? 
•t UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: WELL, YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO 
JBE TAX DEEDS, WILL YOUR RULING INCLUDE SOMETHING THAT 
OGGESTS THAT THOSE DEEDS ARE NO LONGER VALID BECAUSE THERE'S 
PROPERTY TO SUPPORT THEM? WE JUST DON'T WANT AN ISSUE 
IKE THIS TO COME UP AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT REALLY. 
MANT TO BRING THIS THING TO A FINAL CONCLUSION EVEN IF WE 
WE TO BRING THE COUNTY IN SOME WAY. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO 
IEW THAT STATUTE OR — OR ORDER THAT -- OR RULING THAT 
tffit. WARNER HAS FOUND AND — SO WILL YOU FORWARD THAT TO MY 
jpFFICE IMMEDIATELY AND TO EACH OF THE PARTIES? 
MR. WARNER: I WILL. 
THE COURT: TODAY. 
MR. MARTINEAU: FRANK, COULD YOU GIVE US THE CITATION TO 
OR THE REFERENCE TO THE CODE? 
MR. WARNER: I DON'T HAVE IT IN FRONT OF ME, RAY, BUT 
«LL — I'LL FAX IT TO YOU IMMEDIATELY. IT'S IN MY OFFICE. 
THE PARTIES WANNA HOLD, I'LL SEE IF I CAN PUT MY HANDS ON 
THE COURT: WELL ~ 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I AM FAMILIAR WITH THAT STATUTE, 
D THAT STATUTE SUGGESTS THAT THE SALE WAS ORIGINALLY A 
ID SALE. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU CAN'T HAVE A LIEN ON 
THING THAT DOESN'T EXIST. AND IF A TAX SALE WAS DONE 
ROPERLY WITHOUT GIVING PROPER NOTICE, THEN IT DOES GO BACK 
THE ORIGINAL OWNER, AND THE TAX DEED CLAIMANT WOULD HAVE A 
;N. BUT THAT DOESN'T APPLY TO OUR SITUATION WHERE THE 
RT IS FINDING THAT THE TAX DEED ITSELF WASN'T EVER VALID. 
MR. WARNER: WELL, LET ME FAX THAT TO EACH OF THE 
TIES AND THE COURT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IF THERE'S A FURTHER NEED FOR 
iPHONE CONFERENCE, MY CLERK WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH ALL OF 
MR. WARNER: OKAY, 
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THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO DISCUSS? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: THAT'S IT. THANK YOU. 
MR. MARTINEAU: WE — WE CERTAINLY WANT FOR THIS TO LAY 
"-TO REST ANY CLAIMS THAT THE GRIFFITHS GROUP OR THE -- OR 
\ 
&.*HE — THE — 
MR. WARNER: BUTTERS. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: BUTTERS. 
MR. MARTINEAU: -- BUTTERS GROUP DON'T HAVE A CLEAR 
LE TO THEIR PROPERTY FROM THIS POINT FORWARD. 
THE COURT: WELL, OF COURSE --
T MR. MARTINEAU: THERE'S A LOT OF EXPENSE INVOLVED HERE, 
OF LEGAL MANEUVERING, LOT OF ISSUES. WE NEED TO MAKE 
THAT WHATEVER'S DONE LAYS THIS THING FINALLY TO REST. 
f THE COURT: WELL, LET ME JUST MENTION ONE THING THAT HAS 
TO MY MIND SEVERAL TIMES, MR. MARTINEAU. THAT IS THIS: 
JRULING OR THE -- THE CLAIMS BETWEEN BUTTERS AND THE 
ITH GROUP I ADDRESS IN THIS RULING. AND IT SHOULD BE 
END OF IT AS FAR AS THOSE TWO PARTIES ARE CONCERNED ALSO. 
5fHEY ARE NOT ADVERSE PARTIES TO EACH OTHER IN THIS CASE. 
— AND WE ALL KNOW HOW AS YEARS GO ON, BOUNDARIES BY 
IESCENCE CAN ALWAYS RAISE THEIR UGLY HEAD. I'M THINKING 
THESE TWO PARTIES OR THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST SHOULD 
SURE THAT THERE'S SOMETHING RECORDED THAT CLARIFIES 
E BOUNDARIES OR THAT SOMETHING OCCURS TO RESOLVE ANY 
SEE CLAIMS REGARDING THEIR BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE TWO OF 
$ 
it 
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THEM BECAUSE IT'S CERTAINLY BEEN ADDRESSED IN THIS CASE, BUT 
IT ISN'T A RULING AS TO WHERE THEIR BOUNDARY LINES ARE 
BECAUSE I'VE NEVER ACTUALLY HAD A HEARING ON -- BETWEEN THOSE 
*t«0 PARTIES WHO COULD BE ADVERSE PARTIES. YOU SEE WHAT I'M 
i SAYING? 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES. WELL, I THINK IF WE TAKE YOUR 
>HOR'S RULING WHEN IT COMES DOWN — AND I ASSUME YOU'LL WANT 
tfUJDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PREPARED — I THINK 
\T DARIN AND I CAN TAKE THAT AND WE CAN ADD TO THAT 
iTEVER WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY — THE ISSUES BETWEEN 
AND BUTTERS ARE COVERED. 
WHAT WOULD YOU THINK OF THAT, DARIN? 
MR. HAMMOND: I THINK THAT'S WISE. I WOULD LIKE TO 
IDLE THIS RIGHT NOW SO THAT IT DOESN'T BECOME A PROBLEM IN 
FUTURE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN WHY DON'T I HAVE ONE OF YOU 
SPARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AND THROW IN SOME LEGAL 
SCRIPTIONS HERE THAT ARE GONNA ACCOMPLISH THAT? 
MR. MARTINEAU: I'LL BE HAPPY TO UNDERTAKE THAT. 
THE COURT: I ASSUME YOU'VE HAD SOME ACCURATE SURVEYS 
THAT DO LAY OUT THE METES AND BOUNDS. 
It MR. MARTINEAU: YES, WE DO. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO COME 
n 
THE COURT: I — I 'M SAYING METES AND BOUNDS TO THE 
SDARIES BY ACQUIESCENCE BECAUSE I ASSUME THAT'S WHAT WE'D 
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JE TALKING ABOUT AT A TRIAL. 
MR. MARTINEAU: YES. I'D BE HAPPY TO COME UP WITH SOME 
j,; PEOPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IF YOUR HONOR WOULD LIKE ME 
I TO. 
I 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YOUR HONOR, WAS THERE — I ASSUME 
,T THERE'S NO TRIAL BRIEF DUE TOMORROW. 
THE COURT: THERE WON'T BE AS LONG AS — NO, THERE — 
SRE WON'T BE ANYTHING MORE NEEDED. 
to- MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. NOW, WILL YOUR HONOR — WAS YOUR 
*OR GOING TO RULE FIRST OR SHOULD I JUST GO AHEAD AND 
SPARE THE FINDINGS AND WE'LL HAVE THOSE TAKE CARE OF IT? 
THE COURT: WELL, MY RULING GIVEN THE STIPULATION IS 
iDY ON THE RECORD. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK I NEED TO RULE FURTHER AS LONG 
JHAT STIPULATION'S ON THE RECORD. DO EITHER OF YOU — ANY 
lOU SEE A REASON WHY I WOULD NEED TO? 
MR. MARTINEAU: I DON'T. 
MR. WARNER: NO, I DON'T EITHER. I — 
|s UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: NO. 
MR. WARNER: I QUESTION THE NECESSITY OF BOTH THE 
mGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS IN A FORMAL SORT OF WAY. IS 
DERSTANDING, RULINGS ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
|t — DON'T REQUIRE TECHNICAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND — 
THE COURT- WELL, IT'S NOT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL, BUT 
iERE IT'S FINALIZING A CASE SUCH — WITH SUCH COMPLICATED 
ISSUES AS THIS, I WOULD REQUIRE IT. 
MR WARNER: OKAY. 
MR MARTINEAU: YEAH, WE THINK IT'S VERY MUCH IN ORDER. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
v( MR WARNER: THERE'S ONE OTHER ISSUE THAT I DON'T KNOW 
"f IT NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT UP. MR. MARTINEAU, THE DEPOSITION 
STS OF OUR EXPERT DID YOU GET HER BILL AND ARE YOU GOING 
TAKE CARE OF THAT OR DO WE NEED TO PROCEED --
MR. MARTINEAU: I DID GET IT. I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO 
-LY CONSIDER IT. I DON'T THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE LIABLE 
WORK THAT SHE DID IN STUDYING TO GET READY. WE DIDN'T 
HER TO STUDY AND GET READY. WE JUST WANTED HER TO 
IFY TO THE FACTS THAT SHE'S AWARE OF. 
MR. WARNER: OKAY. WELL, IT'S PRETTY MODEST BILL. WHY 
*T YOU LOOK IT OVER AND IF THERE'S A PROBLEM, LET US KNOW. 
THE COURT: AND I'VE ALREADY ISSUED A RULING ON THE 
EXPERTS, HOW I WOULD ALLOW THAT, AND I THINK IT SHOULD 
MERE, TOO. 
MR MARTINEAU: THAT JOHN STALL9 
\THE COURT: YEAH. 
MR MARTINEAU: OKAY. THAT PROBABLY WILL OFFSET AT 
THE OTHER BILL THEN. OKAY. 
' MR. WARNER: WHAT — IS THAT IN YOUR — IS THAT IN YOUR 
'? 
J^ ING THAT YOU --
*% THE COURT: NO. THAT WAS IN A EARLIER MOTION WHERE I 
.KITED WHAT HE COULD CHARGE FOR. 
MR. WARNER: I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH THAT. 
THE COURT: OH, RECALL HE WANTED TO CHARGE WHAT, $200 AN 
FOR ALL OF THE TIME THAT HE SPENT IN PREPARATION, AND I 
fSED THAT? 
»'«•' THE CLERK: WAS THAT IN THE OTHER CASE, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: NO, IT WAS IN THIS CASE. I BELIEVE. 
WAS IT IN ANOTHER I HAD 
MR. WARNER: I THINK -
THE COURT: WASN'T IT 
fALL IN ANOTHER CASE. 
* MR. WARNER: I THINK IT MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE OTHER --
4 THE COURT: OH, I'M SORRY. IT WAS. I DID NOT ALLOW HIM 
CHARGE ALL OF HIS PREPARATION TIME. I DID ALLOW HIM TO 
"'CHARGE FOR THE ACTUAL DEPOSITION TIME. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. I'M NOT AWARE OF THAT. 
THE COURT: NO, AND I — I'M SORRY. THAT WAS ANOTHER 
*IAND CASE THAT I HAD RECENTLY THAT --
MR WARNER: SAME WITNESS. 
THE COURT: -- I WAS CONFUSED ON. BUT HE WAS A WITNESS 
IN THAT ONE AS WELL. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: WILL WE NEED TO COME TO THE FIRST 
DAY OF THE TRIAL TO FINALIZE ANYTHING --
THE COURT: NO. 
1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: — AND WILL THE OTHER DAY BE 
2 CANCELLED? 
3 THE COURT: IT'LL ALL BE CANCELLED. YOU WON'T EVEN NEED 
4 TO APPEAR. 
5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: OKAY. 
6 MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
7 THE COURT: UNLESS SOMEBODY SEES A NEED TO APPEAR. I 
8 DON'T. 
9 MR. MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, IN PREPARING THESE FINDINGS 
10 AND CONCLUSIONS, I WILL — WE'LL WANT TO GET A COPY OF THE — 
11 OF THIS HEARING SO THAT I CAN HAVE EXACTLY BEFORE ME WHAT 
12 YOUR HONOR'S RULED AND WHAT STIPULATIONS HAVE BEEN, SO 
13 (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL ASK ~ I'LL DIRECT MY CLERK 
15 TO HAVE THE COURT REPORTER PREPARE A COPY OF THIS HEARING. 
16 MR. MARTINEAU: OH, BOY, THAT WOULD BE --
17 THE COURT: THE TELEPHONE CONFERENCE. 
18 MR. MARTINEAU: AND THEN BRETT CRAGUN WHO'S IN MY OFFICE 
19 LIVES IN OGDEN. I'LL HAVE HIM PICK UP A COPY. ONCE WE GET 
20 THE COPY, WE'LL COME UP WITH SOME FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
21 WITHOUT DELAY. 
22 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND WE'LL CANCEL ALL HEARINGS 
23 THEN UNLESS SOMEBODY SEES A NEED FOR ONE. 
24 THE CLERK: WE'LL NEED A CHECK OR SOME TYPE OF PAYMENT 
25 FOR THAT COPY OF THE TAPE. 
23 
THE COURT: HOW MUCH I S THAT, $12 OR SOMETHING? 
THE CLERK: FIFTEEN — 1 5 . 
THE COURT: DIANE? 
THE CLERK: $ 1 5 . 
THE COURT: $ 1 5 . GET IT TO MY CLERK, DIANE, 
MR. MARTINEAU. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU WAS GONNA HAVE A 
TRANSCRIPT PREPARED THERE? 
THE COURT: NO. I T ' L L BE A VIDEOTAPE. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: THAT'S ALL YOU'LL NEED. 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. WE'LL GET IT — WE'LL GET THE 
PAYMENT AND WE'LL PICK UP IT UP AS SOON AS WE CAN. 
THE COURT: AND MY CLERK I S DIANE AT 3 9 5 - 1 1 5 6 . 
MR. MARTINEAU: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO DISCUSS? 
MR. WARNER: THINK NOT. 
MR. MARTINEAU: THANKS, JUDGE. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
-k -k *k ic •& 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 23 PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2004 
(Ufo* <rftu 
DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
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Ray G. Martineau (#2105) 
Anthony R. Martineau (#5859) 
Brett D. Cragun (#8683) 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone (801) 486-0200 
Facsimile (801) 486-0383 
Douglas L. Stowell (#6659) 
STOWELL & ASSOCIATES 
307 East Stanton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 944-3459 
Facsimile (801) 483-0705 
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BKB LLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Kenneth A. Griffiths, BKB, LLC and 12 X 12, L.L.C. 
LN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
H.C. MASSEY; and BETTY P. MASSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH A. GRIFFITHS; BKB LLC; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY; WILSON 
IRRIGATION CO.; AARON B. BUTTARS; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; ADELE B. 
LEWIS; FRANCES E. HANKS; KTMEL P. 
FISHER; and JOHN DOES 1 through 100, 
Defendants. 
ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO REAL 
PROPERTY IN 12 X 12, L.L.C. AND 
IN AARON B. BUTTARS AND 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS 
MAY 212004 
Civil No. 960900027 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
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12 X 12, L.L.C., a Limited Liability 
Company; 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H.C. MASSEY; BETTY P. MASSEY; 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY, a 
Corporation; AARON B. BUTTARS; 
BRENDA L. BUTTARS; and ADELE B. 
LEWIS, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled cause came on regularly before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
for a Final Pretrial Telephone Conference on February 24, 2004 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiffs 
appealing by and through their counsel Frank S. Warner, the defendants Kenneth A. 
Griffiths and BKB LLC, and third-party plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C., appearing by and 
through their counsel Ray G. Martineail and Douglas L. Stowell, the defendants Aaron B. 
Buttars, Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis appearing by and through their counsel M. 
Darin Hammond, and the Court having previously approved and signed its Order Of 
Dismissal As To The Defendant Wilson Irrigation Company Only, dated February 19, 
2003, and the Stipulation, Order, And Judgment Of Dismissal With Prejudice Of Plaintiffs' 
Claims Against Questar Gas Company, dated October 9, 2003, and the named defendants 
Frances E. Hanks and Kimel P. Fisher not having been served with process or having 
entered any appearance herein, and the Court having heretofore issued its Ruling 
Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2004, and the Court having 
996 
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JJ heard and carefully considered the statements and arguments of counsel, including the 
*« 
2 statement by plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs ''concede that the property in question that 
pj we claim under the tax deeds has historically been occupied by the defendants and their 
predecessors in interest, together with the Questar Gas property and their predecessors in 
interest • • • for at least 20 years," and that the "defendants and their predecessors in interest 
have paid taxes on the tax notices that were issued to them by the County", and the Court 
having heretofore made and entered its Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and 
being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor hereby makes and 
enters the following judgment: 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint, and all of plaintiffs' claims 
related thereto, should be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits. 
2. The fee simple title to the following described real property located in 
Weber County, State of Utah should be and the same is hereby quieted in third-party 
plaintiff 12 X 12, L.L.C. against and free and clear of any and all claims of every kind and 
nature therein or thereto of the plaintiffs, or either of them, or of any other party hereto, 
including any and all such claims based upon the legal doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence: 
15-063-0035 and 15-062-0036: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
being West 942.09 feet and South 286.17 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 201.72 feet, 
thence West 863.79 feet to the East line of the Willard Canal right-of-way; 
thence Northwesterly along said East line along the arc of a 495 foot radius 
curve to the right a distance of 210.22 feet, the long chord of which bears 
3 9 
"• North 15°20'47" West 209.21 feet; thence East 929.15 feet to the point of 
w 
r>\ beginning. Excepting therefrom the Street on the East. 
U 15-063-0037 and 15-063-0038: Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24, 
£ Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
SJ Survey: Beginning at a point in the center of 1200 West Street, said point 
1/1
 being West 942.09 feet and South 487.89 feet from the East Quarter Corner 
of said Section 24, and running thence South along said center 157 feet; 
thence West along a fence 183 feet; thence South along a fence 40 feet; 
thence West along a fence 202 feet; thence South along a fence 289.80 feet 
in the East line of the Willard Canal right of way; thence Northwesterly 
along said East line as follows: North 45°01' West 559.61 feet to the point 
of a curve; thence along the arc of a 495 foot radius curve to the right a 
distance of 150.93 feet, the long chord of which bears North 36°16'53" 
West 150.35 feet; thence East 269.79 feet to the point of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom the street on the East. 
3. The fee simple title to the following described real property located in 
Weber County, State of Utah should be and the same is hereby quieted in the defendants 
Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars against and free and clear of any and all claims of 
every kind and nature therein or thereto of the plaintiffs, or either of them, or of any other 
party hereto, including any and all such claims based upon the legal doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence: 
A part of the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 24; in 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey, 
in Weber County, State of Utah; Beginning at a point 20 chains sough and 
14.58 chains west of the northeast corner of said quarter section; thence 
west 5.44 chains; thence north TA chains; thence east 5.44 chains; thence 
south TA chains to the place of beginning, containing 414 acres, more or 
less. 
4. Tax Deed No. 1, Tax Deed No. 2, Tax Deed No. 3 and Tax Deed No. 4 are 
hereby decreed invalid and of no force and effect as such relate to the parties in this action. 
5. Each of the parties hereto should be and are hereby ordered to bear and pay 
such party's costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
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DATED this 2^day of ApHy2004. 
£>&£7\J 
Roger Sy©utson 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Quieting Title 
To Real Property In 12 X 12, L.L.C. And hi Aaron B. Buttars And Brenda L. Buttars was 
served upon the following individuals, and by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to 
each of said individuals at the addresses shown below, this 2 *7day of April, 2004. 
Frank S. Warner 
3564 Lincoln Ave, Suite 6 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Abigail L. Jones 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Perrin R. Love 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
M. Darin Hammond 
Smith Knowles & Hamilton PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd, Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84403 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
H.C. Massey and Betty Massey, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
F/(
-ED 
^ A H APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 2 9 2005 
Kenneth A. Griffiths; BKB, 
L.L.C.; 12X12, L.L.C.; Aaron 
B. Buttars; Brenda L. Buttars; 
Adele B. Lewis; Questar Gas 
Company; Wilson Irrigation 
Co,; Frances E. Hanks; Kimel 
P, Fisher; and John Does 1 
through 100, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040650-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 29, 2005) 
2005 UT App 410 
Second District, Ogden Department, 960900027 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Attorneys: Frank S. Warner, Ogden, for Appellants 
Ray G. Martineau, Anthony R. Martineau, Brett D. 
Cragun, Lloyd R. Jones,,and Douglas L. Stowell, Salt 
Lake City, and M. Darin Hammond, Ogden, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Orme. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Kl H.C. and Betty Massey appeal the trial courtfs grant of 
summary judgment in this quiet title action in favor of BKB 
L.L.C, (BKB), 12X12 L.L.C. (12X12), Aaron B. Buttars, Brenda L. 
Buttars, Adele B. Lewis, and Kenneth A. Griffiths (collectively, 
Defendants). The Masseys contend on appeal that their tax deeds 
are superior to Defendants' deeds. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
H2 The subject of this case is real property located in Weber 
County, Utah. At a tax sale, the Masseys purchased four separate 
but contiguous parcels of this property. Two parcels were 
conveyed to the Masseys by tax deeds dated June 12, 1986, and 
recorded June 13, 1986, and two were conveyed by tax deeds dated 
June 8, 1992, and recorded June 10, 1992. 
13 Defendants are successors in interest or current occupiers 
of property located in the same quarter section of Weber County 
as the Masseys' property. Lewis sold her property to her 
daughter and son-in-law, the Buttarses, on December 5, 1994, but 
Lewis continues to live on the property. Griffiths conveyed his 
parcel of land to BKB by warranty deed dated and recorded January 
24, 1994. BKB in turn conveyed the Griffiths property to 12X12 
by quit claim deed October 26, 2000, and the deed was recorded 
November 1, 2000. 
K4 Griffiths!s property, now owned by 12X12, is located 
directly north of the Buttarses' property. A "very old fence" 
has historically served as the boundary between Griffiths!s 
property and the Buttarses' property. However, the properties 
the Masseys acquired at the tax sale, according to their legal 
descriptions, straddle the fence and overlap the properties 
historically occupied by Griffiths and the Buttarses. This 
overlap is the crux of this conflict. 
f5 The record demonstrates that there is no dispute that 
Defendants occupied their respective properties for twenty years 
prior to the Masseys bringing this quiet title action. It is 
also undisputed that Defendants have consistently paid taxes on 
the property described in the notices issued to them by the 
county and that Defendants did not receive notice of the tax sale 
at which the Masseys obtained their tax deeds. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1(6 In determining whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants after determining that 
their deeds were superior to the Masseys' tax deeds, "we view the 
facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." GNS P'ship v. Fullmer, 
873 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and citation 
omitted). "A grant of summary judgment is proper only when there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 1160; see Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
ANALYSIS 
f7 In general, "a tax sale extinguishes all prior private 
claims on the property." A.C. Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
20040650-CA 2 
948 P.2d 771, 776 (Utah 1997) (discussing Union Cent. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486, 489 (1926)). "The statute 
providing for tax sales implicitly recognizes this rule and the 
underlying holding of Black with regard to real property taxes by 
defining the title granted at a tax sale as a ?fee simple' title 
--i.e., one unencumbered by other claims.11 Id. (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-1351.1(9) (a) (1996)). A tax deed therefore usually 
takes precedence over other interests. 
[^8 To be valid, however, a tax sale must be conducted according 
to the strict requirements of the governing statutes. See Tintic 
Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184, 1187 
(1938); see also Page v. McAfee, 26 Utah 2d 208, 487 P.2d 861, 
862 (1971) (holding tax sale invalid because it was not conducted 
by the county auditor, as required by statute). The Utah Supreme 
Court stated in Fivas v. Petersen that 
it is necessary to keep in mind the 
fundamental principles which have been 
established since time immemorial underlying 
adjudications on tax titles. The forfeiture 
of onef s property for the nonpayment of taxes 
has always been regarded as a harsh 
procedure, which may work great hardships on 
property owners. An awareness of this fact 
invariably pervades the decisions in such 
cases, with the result that, in the 
interpretation and application of statutory 
requirements antecedent to forfeiture of 
property, they are construed in favor of the 
taxpayer and against the taxpaying authority, 
and are strictissimi juris. 
5 Utah 2d 280, 300 P.2d 635, 637 (1956) (footnotes omitted) 
(holding tax deed to be invalid because the county treasurer 
failed to mail valuation notices to property owners, as required 
under statute for valid tax sale). 
f9 Elemental to a valid proceeding is a "failure to pay a tax 
assessed against the property f.1 . . . [N] o validity can attach 
to any sale except of the property assessed and delinquent for 
failure to pay the tax levied on the assessment as made." 
Ercanbrack, 74 P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-1351 (1) (a) (2004) ("Upon receiving the tax sale 
listing from the county treasurer, the county auditor shall 
select a date for the tax sale for all real property on which a 
delinquency exists that was not previously redeemed . . , ," 
(emphasis added))/ Thirteenth S. Ltd. v. Summit Vill., Inc., 866 
P.2d 257, 259 (Nev. 1993) ("A sovereign may only convey in a tax 
sale an estate subject to delinquent taxes."). 
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HlO No dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendants 
paid the property taxes assessed on the property they had long 
occupied. At a pretrial conference conducted via telephone, the 
Masseys' attorney conceded that "the property in question that we 
claim under the tax deeds has historically been occupied by the 
[D]efendants and their predecessors in interest . . . for at 
least 2 0 years" and that Defendants "have paid taxes on the tax 
notices that were issued to them by the county, " Several other 
experts and witnesses similarly testified by affidavit that Weber 
County had no interest to convey at the tax sale because property 
taxes were not delinquent.1 
fll The Masseys also argue there is a material dispute about 
whether the property occupied by Defendants, up to the "very old 
fence" line, precisely matches the legal descriptions of the 
property in the tax notices paid by Defendants. The court below 
determined that if a slight discrepancy existed, it was not 
material because the equitable doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence would apply.2 See Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 
145, ^ [17, 24 P. 3d 997. We agree. Even if a small portion of the 
1. Even if the Masseys were able to produce evidence that 
Defendants were delinquent in paying their taxes, the sale would 
be void for another reason. Utah law requires that notice of a 
tax sale be provided to "the last-known recorded owner, the 
occupant of any improved property, and all other interests of 
record." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2) (a) (2004). It is 
undisputed that Defendants, the occupiers of the property, 
received no notice of the sale. 
2, "To establish boundary by acquiescence, a claimant must show 
(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, 
or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, 
(iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." 
Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145,^17, 24 P.3d 997 (quotations 
and citation omitted). The trial court concluded, based on the 
undisputed facts presented by the parties, that 
[t]he boundaries between the Griffiths 
Property [and] the Buttars[es] Property . . . 
have been clearly marked and identified, as 
they are now, by long established fence 
lines, which fence lines have been recognized 
and acquiesced in by the respective owners of 
the Griffiths Property [and] the Buttars [es] 
Property . . . as the actual boundaries 
between their respective properties, for a 
period of not less than twenty continuous 
years immediately preceding the initiation of 
the above-entitled action. 
20040650-CA 4 
land was not described in the tax notices, it became a part of 
Defendants' parcels. Moreover, the Masseys still have not 
produced any evidence that Defendants were delinquent in paying 
property taxes assessed on this portion or that they had an 
opportunity to rectify any delinquency. See Royal St. Land Co. 
v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Utah 1987) (holding that taxpayer 
is only required to pay taxes levied and assessed on property 
even though assessment may not cover all uses of property or 
entire area of property). Thus, this factual dispute is not 
material and summary judgment was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
1112 The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants because no dispute of material facts exists 
regarding Defendants' payment of taxes on the disputed property. 
Therefore, Weber County could not have conveyed valid tax deeds 
to the Masseys. We affirm. 
CarolynHs. McHugh, Judge£^ 
Hi3 WE"CONCUR: 
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